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Abstract Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote
cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punish-
ment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using
compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
109:1165–1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and de-
scribed how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation
in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these cases of evolutionary
dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both
cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is com-
pulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public
good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional
case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We
also argue that optional participation is not as effective under rewards as under punishment.
Keywords Evolutionary game theory · Public good games · Social dilemmas · Rewards ·
Punishment · Equilibrium selection
1 Introduction
Self-interest often leads to freeloading on the contributions of others in the dynamics asso-
ciated with common goods and joint enterprises [22, 41]. As is well known, incentivization,
such as rewarding and punishing, is a popular method for harnessing the selfish action and
for motivating individuals to behave cooperatively [5, 7, 8, 15, 17, 38, 39, 45, 47, 53, 54].
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Experimental and theoretical studies on joint enterprises under various incentive schemes
are growing [3, 20, 21, 28, 37, 50, 51, 59, 60].
Obviously, whether rewards or penalties, sufficiently large incentives can transform
freeloaders into full cooperators, and incentives with small impact do nothing on the out-
comes [50]. However, incentivizing is costly, and such heavy incentives often incur serious
costs on those who provide the incentives, whether in a peer-to-peer or institutional man-
ner. Previous game-theoretic studies on the evolution of cooperation with incentives have
focused on public good games with compulsory participation, and revealed that the inter-
mediate degrees of punishment lead to a couple of stable equilibria, full defection and full
cooperation [7, 8, 42, 47, 50, 54]. In this bi-stable dynamics, establishing full cooperation
requires an initially sufficient fraction of cooperators, or ex ante adjustment to overcome
the initial condition [8, 42]. This situation is a coordination game [57], which is a model
of great interest for analyzing a widespread coordination problem (e.g., in choosing distinct
technical standards).
In contrast to a traditional case with compulsory participation, another approach to the
evolution of cooperation is an option to opt out of joint enterprises [1, 6, 10, 18, 24, 25,
32, 35, 40, 49, 52, 62, 65]. The opting-out option can make the freeloader problem relaxed:
individuals can exit a joint venture when stuck in a state in which all freeload off one another
(“economic stalemate”), and then pursue a stand-alone project; if a joint venture with mutual
cooperation is more profitable than in isolation, the individuals once exited will switch to
contributing to the venture. This situation, however, will also find defection attractive. Thus,
joint enterprises with optional participation can give rise to a rock-paper-scissors cycle [24,
25, 35, 52].
Recently, Sasaki et al. [50] revealed that considering optional participation as well as
institutional incentives can effect fully cooperative outcomes for the intermediate ranges of
incentives. They demonstrated that opting-out combined with rewarding is not very effective
at establishing full cooperation, but opting-out combined with punishment is very effective
at establishing cooperation. Although there are a series of existing papers on the interplay
of punishment and opting-out mechanisms [9, 13, 16, 26, 55, 56, 61], the main points of
these earlier studies comprise solving the puzzling issue of second-order freeloading: the
exploitation of the efforts of others to uphold incentives for cooperation [7, 38, 41, 43, 63].
Sasaki et al. [50] consider incentives controlled exclusively by a centralized authority (like
the empire or state) [2, 4, 12, 31], and thus, their model is already free from the second-order
freeloader problem.
Here we analytically provide a full classification of the replicator dynamics in a pub-
lic good game with institutional incentives and optional participation. We clarify when and
how cooperation can be selected over defection in a bi-stable situation associated with in-
stitutional punishment without requiring any ability to communicate among individuals.
In particular, assuming that the penalties are large enough to cause bi-stability with both
full cooperation and full defection (no matter what the basins of attraction are) in cases of
compulsory participation, cooperation will necessarily become selected in the long term,
regardless of the initial conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we formalize optional public good games
with institutional incentives and determine the average payoffs for the three strategies: coop-
eration, defection, and non-participation. In Sect. 3, based on analytical results from compul-
sory games (Sect. 3.1), we explore the interior equilibrium (Sect. 3.2) and in detail classify
global dynamics for the three strategies (Sect. 3.3). Finally, in Sect. 4 we provide further
discussion and concluding remarks.
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2 Model
2.1 Social Dilemmas
To describe our institutional-incentive model, we start from public good games with group
size n ≥ 2. The n players in a group are given the opportunity to participate in a public
good game. We assume that participation pays a fixed entrance fee σ > 0 to the sanctioning
institution, whereas non-participation yields nothing. We denote by m the number of players
who are willing to participate (0 ≤ m ≤ n) and assume that at least two participants are
required for the game to occur [9, 13, 24, 26, 55]. If the game does take place, each of the m
participants in the group can decide whether to invest a fixed amount c > 0 into a common
pool, knowing that each contribution will be multiplied by r > 1 and then shared equally
among all m− 1 other participants in the group. Thus, participants have no direct gain from
their own investments [13, 15, 55, 56, 63]. If all of the participants invest, they obtain a net
payoff (r − 1)c > 0. The game is a social dilemma, which is independent of the value of r ,
because participants can improve their payoffs by withholding their contribution.
Let us next assume that the total incentive stipulated by a sanctioning institution is pro-
portional to the group size m and hence of the form mδ, where δ > 0 is the (potential) per
capita incentive. If rewards are employed to incentivize cooperation, these funds will be
shared among the so-called “cooperators” who contribute (see [48] for a voluntary reward
fund). Hence, each cooperator will obtain a bonus that is denoted by mδ/nC, where nC de-
notes the number of cooperators in the group of m participants. If penalties are employed
to incentivize cooperation, “defectors” who do not contribute will analogously have their
payoffs reduced by mδ/nD, where nD denotes the number of defectors in the group of m
participants (m = nC + nD).
We consider an infinitely large and well-mixed population of players, from which n sam-
ples are randomly selected to form a group for each game. Our analysis of the underlying
evolutionary game is based especially on the replicator dynamics [30] for the three cor-
responding strategies of the cooperator, defector, and non-participant, with respective fre-
quencies x, y, and z. The combination of all possible values of (x, y, z) with x, y, z ≥ 0 and
x + y + z = 1 forms the triangular state space Δ. We denote by C, D, and N the three ver-
tices of Δ that correspond to the three homogeneous states in which all cooperate (x = 1),
defect (y = 1), or are non-participants (z = 1), respectively. For Δ, the replicator dynamics
is defined by
x˙ = x(P sC − P¯ s
)
, y˙ = y(P sD − P¯ s
)
, z˙ = z(P sN − P¯ s
)
, (1)
where P¯ s denotes the average payoff in the entire population; P sC, P sD, and P sN denote the
expected payoff values for cooperators, defectors, and non-participants, respectively; and
s = o, r,p is used to specify one of three different incentive schemes, namely, “without
incentives,” “with rewards,” and “with punishment,” respectively. Because non-participants
have a payoff of 0, P sN = 0, and thus, P¯ s = xP sC + yP sD.
We note that if (r −1)c > σ , the three edges of the state space Δ form a heteroclinic cycle
without incentives: N → C → D → N (Figs. 2a or 3a). Defectors dominate cooperators
because of the cost of contribution c, and non-participants dominate defectors because of
the cost of participation σ . Finally, cooperators dominate non-participants because of the
net benefit from the public good game with (r − 1)c > σ . In the interior of Δ, all of the
trajectories originate from and converge to N, which is a non-hyperbolic equilibrium. Hence,
cooperation can emerge only in brief bursts, sparked by random perturbations [13, 25].
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2.2 Payoffs
Here, we calculate the average payoff for the whole population and the expected payoff
values for cooperators and defectors. In a group with m−1 co-participants (m = 2, . . . , n), a
defector or a cooperator obtains from the public good game an average payoff of rcx/(1−z)
[13]. Hence,
P oD =
(
rc
x
1 − z − σ
)
(
1 − zn−1). (2)
Note that zn−1 is the probability of finding no co-players and, thus, of being reduced to non-
participation. In addition, cooperators contribute c with a probability 1 − zn−1, and thus,
P oC − P oD = −c(1 − zn−1). Hence, P¯ o = (1 − zn−1)[(r − 1)cx − σ(1 − z)].
We now turn to the cases with institutional incentives. First, we consider penalties. Be-
cause cooperators never receive penalties, we have P pC = P oC. In a group in which the m − 1
co-participants include k cooperators (and thus, m − 1 − k defectors), switching from de-
fecting to cooperating implies avoiding the penalty mδ/(m − k). Hence,
P
p
C − P pD =
(
P oC − P oD
) +
n∑
m=2
(
n − 1
m − 1
)
(1 − z)m−1zn−m
×
[
m−1∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)(
x
1 − z
)k(
y
1 − z
)m−1−k
mδ
m − k
]
= −(c − δ)(1 − zn−1) + δ x(1 − (1 − y)
n−1)
y
, (3)
and thus,
P¯ p = P¯ o − δ[y(1 − zn−1) + x(1 − (1 − y)n−1)]
= (1 − zn−1)((r − 1)cx − σ(1 − z) − δy) − δx(1 − (1 − y)n−1). (4)
Next, we consider rewards. It is now the defectors who are unaffected, implying
P rD = P oD. In a group with m − 1 co-participants, including k cooperators, switching from
defecting to cooperating implies obtaining the reward mδ/(k + 1). Hence,
P rC − P rD =
(
P oC − P oD
) +
n∑
m=2
(
n − 1
m − 1
)
(1 − z)m−1zn−m
×
[
m−1∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)(
x
1 − z
)k(
y
1 − z
)m−1−k
mδ
k + 1
]
= −(c − δ)(1 − zn−1) + δ y(1 − (1 − x)
n−1)
x
, (5)
and thus,
P¯ r = P¯ o + δ[x(1 − zn−1) + y(1 − (1 − x)n−1)]
= (1 − zn−1)((r − 1)cx − σ(1 − z) + δx) − δy(1 − (1 − x)n−1). (6)
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3 Results
3.1 Coordination and Coexistence for Compulsory Participation
We investigated the interplay of institutional incentives and optional participation. As a first
step, we considered replicator dynamics along the three edges of the state space Δ. On the
DN-edge (x = 0), this dynamics is always D → N because the payoff for non-participating
is better than that for defecting by at least the participation fee σ , regardless of whether
penalties versus rewards are in place. On the NC-edge (y = 0), it is obvious that if the public
good game is too expensive (i.e., if σ ≥ (r − 1)c, under penalties or σ ≥ (r − 1)c + δ, under
rewards), players will opt for non-participation more than cooperation. Indeed, N becomes
a global attractor because z˙ > 0 holds in Δ \ {z = 0}. We do not consider cases further but
assume that the dynamics of the NC-edge is always N → C.
On the CD-edge (z = 0), the dynamics corresponds to compulsory participation, and Eq.
(1) reduces to x˙ = x(1 − x)(P sC − P sD). Clearly, both of the ends C (x = 1) and D (x = 0)
are fixed points. Under penalties, the term for the payoff difference is
P
p
C − P pD = −c + δ
1 − xn
1 − x = −c + δ
n−1∑
i=0
xi. (7)
Under rewards, it is
P rC − P rD = −c + δ
1 − (1 − x)n
x
= −c + δ
n−1∑
i=0
(1 − x)i . (8)
Because δ > 0, P pC − P pD strictly increases, and P rC − P rD strictly decreases, with x. The
condition under which there exists an interior equilibrium R on the CD-edge is
δ− < δ < δ+, with δ− = c
n
and δ+ = c. (9)
Next, we summarize the game dynamics for compulsory public good games (Fig. 1). For
such a small δ that δ < δ−, defection is a unique outcome; D is globally stable, and C is
unstable. For such a large δ that δ > δ+, cooperation is a unique outcome; C is globally
stable, and D is unstable. For the intermediate values of δ, cooperation evolves in different
ways under penalties versus rewards, as follows. Under penalties (Fig. 1a), as δ crosses the
threshold δ−, C becomes stable, and an unstable interior equilibrium R splits off from C.
The point R separates the basins of attraction of C and D. Penalties cause bi-stable compe-
tition between cooperators and defectors, which is often exhibited as a coordination game
[57]; one or the other norm will become established, but there can be no coexistence. With
increasing δ, the basin of attraction of D becomes increasingly smaller, until δ attains the
value of δ+. Here, R merges with the formerly stable D, which becomes unstable.
In contrast, under rewards (Fig. 1b), as δ crosses a threshold δ−, D becomes unstable, and
a stable interior equilibrium R splits off from D. The point R is a global attractor. Rewards
give rise to the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors, which is a typical result in a
snowdrift game [58]. As δ increases, the fraction of cooperators within the stable coexistence
becomes increasingly larger. Finally, as δ reaches another threshold δ+, R merges with the
formerly unstable C, which becomes stable. We note that both δ+ and δ− do not depend on
whether we take into account rewards or penalties.
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Fig. 1 Compulsory public good games with institutional incentives. The location of stable and unstable
equilibria (thick continuous lines and dashed lines, respectively) and the direction of evolution (dotted arrows)
vary, depending on the per capita incentive, δ. For very small and sufficiently large values of δ, full defection
(x = 0) and full cooperation (x = 1) are the final outcomes, respectively. This applies to both incentives
considered. Intermediate values of δ impact evolutionary dynamics in a strikingly different way, as follows.
(a) Punishment. When δ increases beyond a threshold δ− , an unstable interior equilibrium R enters the state
space at x = 1, moves left, and eventually exits it at x = 0 for δ = δ+ . (b) Rewards. When δ increases beyond
a threshold δ− , a (globally) stable interior equilibrium R enters the state space at x = 0, moves right, and
eventually exits it at x = 1 for δ = δ+ . Consequently, for the interval δ− < δ < δ+ (gray-colored region),
punishment results in bi-stability of both pure states; rewards lead to a stable mixture independent of the
initial state. Parameters: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, and σ = 0.5
3.2 The Interior Equilibrium Q for Optional Participation
Now, we consider the interior of the state space Δ. We start by exploring the fixed point in
the interior. For this purpose, we introduce the coordinate system (f, z) in Δ \ {z = 1}, with
f = x/(x + y), and we rewrite Eq. (1) as
f˙ = f (1 − f )(P sC − P sD
)
, z˙ = −zP¯ s . (10)
Dividing the right-hand side of Eq. (10) by 1 − zn−1, which is positive in Δ \ {z = 1},
corresponds to a change in velocity and does not affect the orbits in Δ [30]. Using Eqs.
(3)–(6), this transforms Eq. (10) into the following. Under penalties, Eq. (10) becomes
f˙ = f (1 − f )[−c + δ + δfH(f, z)],
z˙ = z(1 − z)[σ + δ − ((r − 1)c + δ)f + δf (1 − f )H(f, z)],
(11)
whereas under rewards, it becomes
f˙ = f (1 − f )[−c + δ + δ(1 − f )H(1 − f, z)],
z˙ = z(1 − z)[σ − ((r − 1)c + δ)f + δf (1 − f )H(1 − f, z)],
(12)
where
H(f, z) = 1 − [f + (1 − f )z]
n−1
(1 − f )(1 − zn−1) =
1 + [f + (1 − f )z] + · · · + [f + (1 − f )z]n−2
1 + z + · · · + zn−2 .
(13)
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Note that H(f,0) = ∑n−2i=0 f i and H(f,1) = 1.
At an interior equilibrium Q = (fQ, zQ), the three different strategies must have equal
payoffs, which, in our model, means that they all must equal 0. The conditions P oC = P pC = 0
under penalties and P oD = P rD = 0 under rewards imply that fQ is given by
fQ(p) = c + σ
rc
under penalties and fQ(r) = σ
rc
under rewards, (14)
respectively. Thus, if it exists, the interior equilibrium Q must be located on the line given
by f = fQ. From Eqs. (11) and (12), Q must satisfy
H(f, z) = c − δ
δf
under penalties and H(1 − f, z) = c − δ
δ(1 − f ) under rewards. (15)
When there are only two players (i.e., pairwise interactions with n = 2), there are either
no interior equilibria or else a line of interior equilibria that connects R and N (the latter
situation can arise for only one choice of δ). A summary of the dynamics for n = 2 is given
in Sect. 3.4. Here we analyze the general case of a public good game with more than two
players (i.e., n > 2). Then, if Q exists, it is uniquely determined and a saddle point, whether
incentives are penalties or rewards (see Appendices A.1 and A.2 for detailed proofs of the
uniqueness and the saddle, respectively). As δ increases, Q splits off from R (with xR = fQ)
and moves across the state space along the line given by Eq. (14) and finally exits this space
through N. The function H decreases with increasing z, and the right-hand side of Eq. (15)
decreases with increasing δ, which implies that zQ increases with δ. By substituting Eq. (13)
into Eq. (15), we find that the threshold values of δ for Q’s entrance (z = 0) and exit (z = 1)
into the state space are respectively given by
δs = c1 + B + · · · + Bn−1 and δ
s = c
1 + B , (16)
where B = fQ(p) (and s = p) under penalties, and B = 1 − fQ(r) (and s = r) under rewards.
We note that δ− < δs ≤ δs < δ+, which is an equality only for n = 2.
3.3 Classification of Global Dynamics
Here, we analyze in detail the global dynamics using Eqs. (11) and (12), which are well
defined on the entire unit square U = {(f, z) : 0 ≤ f ≤ 1,0 ≤ z ≤ 1}. The induced map-
ping, cont : U → Δ, contracts the edge z = 1 onto the vertex N. Note that C = (1,0) and
D = (0,0) as well as both ends of the edge z = 1, N0 = (0,1) and N1 = (1,1), are hyper-
bolic equilibria, except when each undergoes bifurcation (as shown later). We note that the
dynamic on the N1N0-edge is unidirectional to N0 without incentives.
First, we examine penalties. From Eq. (11), the Jacobians at C and N0 are respectively
given by
JC =
(
c − nδ 0
0 −[(r − 1)c − σ ]
)
and JN1 =
(
c − 2δ 0
0 (r − 1)c − σ
)
. (17)
From our assumption that (r − 1)c > σ , it follows that if δ < c/n, then detJC < 0, and thus,
C is a saddle point; otherwise, detJC > 0 and trJC < 0, and thus, C is a sink. Regarding N1,
if δ < c/2, N1 is a source (detJN1 > 0 and trJN1 > 0); otherwise, N1 is a saddle (detJN1 <
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0). Next, the Jacobians at D and N0 are respectively given by
JD =
(−(c − nδ) 0
0 σ + δ
)
and JN0 =
(−(c − nδ) 0
0 −(σ + δ)
)
. (18)
If δ < c, D is a saddle point (detJD < 0), and N0 is a sink (detJN0 > 0 and trJN0 < 0);
otherwise, D is a source (detJD > 0 and trJD > 0), and N0 is a saddle point (detJN0 < 0).
We also analyze the stability of R. As δ increases from c/n to c, the boundary repellor
R = (xR,0) enters the CD-edge at C and then moves to D. The Jacobian at R is given by
JR =
(
δxR(1 − xR) ∂∂f fH(f, z)|R ∗
0 −rcxR + (c + σ)
)
. (19)
Its upper diagonal component is positive because ∂H(f, z)/∂f ≥ 0 and H > 0, whereas the
lower component vanishes at xR = fQ(p) = (c + σ)/(rc). Therefore, if fQ(p) < xR < 1, R is
a saddle point (detJR < 0) and is stable with respect to z; otherwise, if 0 < xR < fQ(p), R is
a source (detJR > 0 and trJD > 0).
In addition, a new boundary equilibrium S = (xS,1) can appear along the N1N0-edge.
Solving f˙ (xS,1) = 0 in Eq. (11) yields xS = (c − δ)/δ; thus, S is unique. S is a repellor
along the edge (as is R). As δ increases, S enters the edge at N1 (for δ = c/2) and exits it at
N0 (for δ = c). The Jacobian at S is given by
JS =
(
δxS(1 − xS) ∂∂f fH(f, z)|S ∗
0 δx2S + (r − 1)cxS − σ − δ
)
. (20)
Again, its upper diagonal component is positive. Using xS = (c − δ)/δ, we find that the sign
of the lower component changes once, from positive to negative, as δ increases from c/2
to c. Therefore, S is initially a source (detJS > 0 and trJS > 0) but then turns into a saddle
point (detJS < 0), which is stable with respect to z.
Let us now turn to rewards. From Eq. (12), the Jacobians at D and N0 are
JD =
(−(c − nδ) 0
0 σ
)
and JN0 =
(−(c − 2δ) 0
0 −σ
)
. (21)
If δ < c/n, D is a saddle point (detJD < 0); otherwise, D is a source (detJD > 0 and trJD >
0). Regarding N0, if δ < c/2, N0 is a sink (detJN0 > 0 and trJN0 < 0); otherwise, N0 is a
saddle point (detJN0 < 0). Meanwhile, the Jacobians at C and N1 are
JC =
(
c − δ 0
0 −[(r − 1)c − σ + δ]
)
and JN1 =
(
c − δ 0
0 (r − 1)c − σ + δ
)
. (22)
From (r − 1)c > σ − δ, it follows that if δ < c, C is a saddle point (detJC < 0), and N1 is a
source (detJN1 > 0 and trJN1 > 0); otherwise, C is a sink (detJC > 0 and trJC < 0), and N1
is a saddle point (detJN1 < 0).
We also analyze the stability of R. As δ increases from c/n to c, the boundary attractor
R enters the CD-edge at D and then moves toward C. The Jacobian at R is given by
JR =
(−δxR(1 − xR) ∂∂f (1 − f )H(1 − f, z)|R ∗
0 −rcxR + σ
)
. (23)
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Its upper diagonal component is negative because ∂H(1 − f, z)/∂f ≤ 0 and H > 0, and the
lower component vanishes at xR = fQ(r) = σ/(rc). Therefore, if 0 < xR < fQ(r), R is a saddle
point (detJR < 0) and unstable with respect to z; otherwise, if fQ(r) < xR < 1, R is a sink
(detJR > 0 and trJR < 0).
Similarly, a boundary equilibrium S can appear along the N1N0-edge. Solving f˙ (xS,1) =
0 in Eq. (12) yields xS = 1− (c− δ)/δ, and thus, S is unique. S is an attractor along the edge
(as is R). As δ increases, S enters the edge at N0 (for δ = c/2) and exits at N1 (for δ = c).
The Jacobian at S is
JS =
(−δxS(1 − xS) ∂∂f (1 − f )H(1 − f, z)|S ∗
0 −[δx2S − ((r − 1)c + 2δ)xS + σ ]
)
. (24)
Again, its upper diagonal component is positive. Using xS = 1 − (c − δ)/δ, we find that the
sign of the lower component changes once, from negative to positive, as δ increases from
c/2 to c. Therefore, S is initially a sink (detJS > 0 and trJS < 0) and then becomes a saddle
point (detJS < 0), which is unstable with respect to z.
We give a full classification of the global dynamics, as follows.
1. For 0 ≤ δ < δ− (Figs. 2a and 3a), C and D are saddle points, N1 is a source, and N0
is a sink. There is no other equilibrium, and f˙ < 0 holds in the interior state space.
All interior orbits originate from N1 and converge to N0. N0 is globally stable. After
applying the contraction map, we find that the interior of Δ is filled with homoclinic
orbits originating from and converging to N.
2. As δ crosses δ− (Figs. 2b and 3b), under penalties, C becomes a sink, and the saddle
point R enters the CD-edge at C; under rewards, D turns into a source, and R enters the
same edge through D.
Penalties. There exists an orbit originating from N1 and converging to R that separates
the basins of attraction of C and N0. All of the orbits in the basin of N0 have their α-
limits at N1. Hence, the corresponding region in Δ is filled with homoclinic orbits and is
surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → R → D → N. However, if the population is in
the vicinity of N, small and rare random perturbations will eventually send the population
into the basin of attraction of C (as is the case for c/2 < δ).
Rewards. There exists an orbit originating from R and converging N0. In contrast to
the case with penalties, N0 remains a global attractor. A region separated by the orbit
RN0 encloses orbits with N1 as their α-limit. Therefore, in Δ, the corresponding region
is filled with homoclinic orbits that are surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → C → R
→ N.
3. As δ crosses c/2 (Figs. 2c and 3c), under penalties, N1 becomes a saddle point, and the
source S enters the N1N0-edge at N1; under rewards, N0 becomes a saddle point, and the
sink S enters the same edge at N0. As δ increases, S moves toward N0 (penalties) or N1
(rewards).
Penalties. If c/2 < δp holds, then for c/2 < δ < δp, there is still an orbit originating
from S and converging to R that separates the interior of Δ into the basins of attraction
of C and N0. All of the orbits in the basin of N0 have their α-limits at N1, as before. In Δ,
the separatrix NR and the NC-edge now intersect transversally at N, and the entrance of a
minority of participants (including cooperators and defectors) into the greater population
of non-participants may be successful.
Rewards. If c/2 < δr holds, then for c/2 < δ < δr, there exists an orbit originating
from R and converging to S that divides the interior of Δ into two regions: one of them
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Fig. 2 Optional public good games with institutional punishment. The triangles represent the state space
Δ = {(x, y, z) : x, y, z > 0, x + y + z = 1}. Its vertices C, D, and N correspond to the three homogeneous
states of cooperators (x = 1), defectors (y = 1), and non-participants (z = 1), respectively. The unit squares
represent an extended state space U = {(f, z) : 0 ≤ f ≤ 1,0 ≤ z ≤ 1} such that Δ is its image according to
the mapping x = f (1 − z), y = (1 − f )(1 − z), which is injective except for z = 1. The edge is contracted
to N. The vertices of U are denoted by C = (1,0), D = (0,0), N1 = (1,1), and N0 = (0,1). The stream plot
is based on Eq. (11). Dotted and dashed curves in U denote where f˙ and z˙ vanish, respectively. (a) Without
incentives, the interior of U is filled with orbits originating from N1 and then converging to N0, which cor-
respond to homoclinic cycles fully covering the interior of Δ. (b) As δ increases, the equilibrium R (a saddle
point) first enters the CD-edge at C, which then becomes a sink. (c) When δ crosses c/2, the equilibrium S
(a source) enters the N1N0-edge at N1, which then becomes a saddle point. (d) When δ crosses δp, the saddle
point Q enters the interior of Δ through R, which then becomes a source. Q traverses U along a horizontal
line. (e) When δ crosses δp, Q exits Δ through S, which then becomes a saddle. For larger values of δ, there is
no interior orbit that originates from the N1N0-edge and converges to it, and thus, Δ has no homoclinic cycle.
When δ crosses δ+ , R and S exit Δ through D, which becomes a source, respectively N0, which becomes a
saddle. (f) For δ > δ+ , the interiors of U and Δ are filled with orbits originating from D and converging to C.
Parameters are the same as in Fig. 1: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, σ = 0.5, and δ = 0 (a), 0.25 (b), 0.51 (c), 0.55 (d),
0.7 (e), or 1.2 (f)
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Fig. 3 Optional public good games with institutional rewards. Notations are as in Fig. 2, and the stream
plot is based on Eq. (12). (a) Without incentives, this figure is the same as Fig. 2a. (b) As δ increases, the
equilibrium R (a saddle point) first enters the CD-edge at D, which then becomes a source. (c) When δ crosses
δr, the saddle point Q enters the interior of Δ through R, which then becomes a sink. Q traverses U along
a horizontal line. (d) When δ crosses c/2, the rest point S (a sink) enters the N1N0-edge at N0, which then
becomes a saddle point. (e) When δ crosses δr, Q exits U through S, which then becomes a saddle point.
For larger values of δ, there is no interior orbit that originates from the N1N0-edge and converges to it and,
thus, Δ has no homoclinic cycle. When δ crosses δ+ , R and S exit Δ through C, which becomes a sink,
respectively N1, which becomes a saddle. (f) For δ > δ+ , C is a global attractor as in Fig. 2f. The parameters
are the same as in Figs. 1 and 2, except δ = 0 (a), 0.25 (b), 0.35 (c), 0.52 (d), 0.7 (e), or 1.2 (f)
consists of orbits originating from N1, corresponding in Δ to a region filled with homo-
clinic orbits; the other one consists of orbits originating from D.
4. Penalties. As δ crosses δp (Fig. 2d), the saddle point Q enters the interior of Δ through
R, which becomes a source. Based on the uniqueness of Q and the Poincaré–Bendixson
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theorem ([30], Appendix A.3), we can see that there is no such homoclinic orbit origi-
nating from and converging to Q, and the unstable manifold of Q must consist of an orbit
converging to C and an orbit converging to N0; the stable manifold of Q must consist of
an orbit originating from D and an orbit originating from S (or, in the case that δp < c/2,
from N1 for δp < δ < c/2). The stable manifold separates the basins of attraction of C
and N0; the unstable manifold separates the basin for N0 into two regions. One of these
regions is filled with orbits originating from S (or from N1 under the above conditions)
and converging to N0. For Δ, this means that the corresponding region is filled with ho-
moclinic orbits and is surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → Q → N (Fig. 2d). As δ
further increases, Q moves across U , from the CD-edge to the N1N0-edge along the line
f = fQ(p).
Rewards. As δ crosses δr (Fig. 3d), Q enters the interior of Δ through R, which
becomes a sink. As δ continues to increase, similarly Q moves to the N1N0-edge, along
the line f = fQ(r). There is no homoclinic loop for Q, as under penalties, and now, we
find that the stable manifold of Q must consist of two orbits originating from D and
N1; the unstable manifold of Q must consist of an orbit converging to R and another
converging to S (or, in the case that δr < c/2, to N0 for δr < δ < c/2 (Fig. 3c)). The
stable manifold separates the basins of attraction of R and S (or N0 under the above
conditions); the unstable manifold separates the basin for S (or N0) into two regions.
One of these regions is filled with orbits issuing from N1 and converging to S (or N0).
The corresponding region in Δ is filled with homoclinic orbits and is surrounded by a
heteroclinic cycle N → Q → N (Figs. 3c and 3d). If the population is in the vicinity of
N, small and rare random perturbations will eventually send the population into the basin
of attraction of R (as is the case for δr < δ).
5. As δ crosses δp under penalties (Fig. 2e) or δr under rewards (Fig. 3e), Q exits the state
space through S, which then becomes a saddle point. For larger values of δ, there is no
longer an interior equilibrium.
6. Finally, as δ crosses δ+ (Figs. 2f and 3f), R and S simultaneously exit U , through D and
N0 (penalties) or C and N1 (rewards), respectively. For δ+ < δ, N1 and N0 are saddle
points, D is a source, and C is a sink. f˙ > 0 holds throughout the state space. All of the
interior orbits originate from D and converge to C. Hence, C is globally stable.
3.4 Degenerate Dynamics for Pairwise Interactions with n = 2
In the specific case when n = 2, by solving Eqs. (14) and (15) with H(f, z) = 1, the dynam-
ics has an interior equilibrium only when
δ = rc
2
(r + 1)c + σ under penalties and δ =
rc2
2rc − σ under rewards. (25)
At this moment, throughout both incentives, R and S in U undergo bifurcation simultane-
ously, and the line f = fQ given in Eq. (14), which consists of a continuum of equilibria,
connects R and S (and in Δ, R and N) (Fig. 4). When δ does not take the specific value in Eq.
(25), there is no interior equilibrium, and the global dynamics is classified as in the general
case when n > 2 (see the list 1–3, 5, 6 of Sect. 3.3). Within pairwise interactions, therefore,
the interior dynamics degenerates. This exceptional case was not described in Sasaki et al.
[50].
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Fig. 4 Degenerate interior dynamics for n = 2. Notations are as in Fig. 2, and the stream plot is given under
(a) penalties based on Eq. (11) and (b) rewards based on Eq. (12) with a specific δ in Eq. (25). For n = 2,
only when δ takes the specific value, the state space has an interior equilibrium, which is a linear continuum
of the equilibria. (a) Under penalties, the fixed-point line that connects N (S in U ) and R is repelling and
divides Δ into basins of attraction of N (N0 in U ) and C. From the vicinity of N, arbitrarily small random
perturbations will send the state into the region of attraction of C. (b) Under rewards, the fixed-point line is
attracting, and thus, the interior orbits converge to corresponding points on the line. Other parameters include
c = 1, σ = 0.5, and r = 3 (a) or 1 (b), which leads to that the degeneracy arises at δ = 2/3 for penalties as
well as for rewards
4 Discussion
We considered a model for the evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives
and analyzed in detail the evolutionary game dynamics. We employed public goods games,
which typically assume that there are at least three players. Specifically, based on a public
good game with optional participation, we fully analyzed how opting-out impacts on game
dynamics; in particular, opting-out can completely overcome a coordination problem as-
sociated with punishment for a considerably broader range of parameters than in cases of
compulsory participation.
We start from assuming that there is a state-like institution that takes exclusive control
of individual-level sanctions in the form of penalties and rewards. In our extended model,
nobody is forced to enter a joint enterprise that is protected by the institutional sanctioning.
However, whoever is willing to enter, must be charged at the entrance. Further, if one proves
unable or unwilling to pay, the sanctioning institution can ban that person from participation
in the game. Indeed, joint ventures in real life are mostly protected by enforceable contracts
in which members can freely participate, but are then bound by a higher authority. For
example, anyone can opt to not participate in a wedding vow, but once it is taken, it is
among the strongest enforceable contracts. As far as we know, higher authorities always
demand penalties if contracts are broken.
Based on our mathematical analysis, we argue that institutional punishment, rather than
institutional rewards, can become a more viable incentivization scheme for cooperation
when combined with optional participation. In spite of the fact that the expected payoffs
include nonlinear terms, the corresponding replicator dynamics is completely analyzed: in
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particular, proving that the interior equilibrium for optional participation is unique and a
saddle point plays a key role in solving the global dynamics.
We show that combining optional participation with rewards can only marginally im-
prove group welfare (to the same level as the non-participant’s fixed payoff) for a small
range of the per capita incentive δ, with δ− < δ < δr (Fig. 3b). Within this interval, compul-
sory participation can lead to partial cooperation; however, optional participation eliminates
the cooperation and thus drives a population into a state in which all players exit. Hence,
freedom of participation is not a particularly effective way of boosting cooperation under a
rewards scenario.
Under penalties, the situation changes considerably. Indeed, as soon as δ > δ− (Fig. 2b),
the state in which all players cooperate abruptly turns into a global attractor for optional
participation. When δ just exceeds δ−, group welfare becomes the maximum (r − 1)c −
σ . Meanwhile, for compulsory participation, a largest part of the (boundary) state space
between cooperation and defection still belongs to the basin of attraction of the state in
which all players defect. Because δ− = c/n, where n is the group size, and c is the net
contribution cost (a constant), when n is larger, the minimal sanctioning cost δ− to establish
full cooperation is smaller.
Collaborating results for compulsory participation have recently been obtained in con-
tinuous public good games with institutional incentives by Cressman et al. [12], who con-
sidered the gradual evolution of continuously varying contribution to a public good. The
authors show that rewarding and punishing with probabilities depending on the player’s
contribution and those of the co-players, can destabilize full defection and stabilize full co-
operation, respectively. This model also indicates that combining the best of both incentives
would lead the population to full cooperation, irrespective of the initial condition. Looking
back at our model, non-participation reflects the common characteristic of destabilizing full
defection; thus, it would be fascinating to investigate how efficiently voluntary rewards [28,
48, 54], instead of voluntary participation, can establish coercion-based cooperation.
In the next two paragraphs, we consider only the penalty scenario and the corresponding
coordination situation. There are various approaches to equilibrium selection in n-person
coordination games for binary choices [19, 29, 34]. A strand of literature uses stochastic
evolution models [14, 33, 64], in which typically, a risk-dominant equilibrium [23] that has
the larger basin of attraction is selected through random fluctuation in the long run. In con-
trast, considering optional participation, our model typically selects the cooperation equilib-
rium which provides the higher group welfare, even if the cooperation equilibrium has the
smaller basin of attraction when participation is compulsory than has the defection equilib-
rium. In the sense of favoring the efficient equilibrium, our result is similar to that found in
a decentralized partner-changing model proposed by Oechssler [36], in which players may
occasionally change interaction groups.
Higher-order freeloaders are problematic for decentralized peer-to-peer sanctions [11, 41].
This is not the case, however, for centralized institutional sanctions. In addition, it is clear
that sanctioning institutions will stipulate a lesser antisocial punishment targeted at cooper-
ators [27], which can prevent the evolution of pro-social behaviors ([44, 46], see also [18]).
Indeed, punishing cooperators essentially promotes defectors, who will reduce the number
of participants willing to pay for social institutions. For self-sustainability, thus, sanctioning
institutions should dismiss any antisocial schemes that may lead to a future reduction in
resources for funding the institution.
Thus, we find that our model restricts the space of possible actions into a very narrow
framework of alternative strategies, while increasing complexity. In practice, truly chaotic
situations which offer a very long list of possibilities are unfeasible and create inconve-
nience, as is described by Michael Ende in “The Prison of Freedom” [1992]. Participants
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in economic experiments usually can make their meaningful choices only from a short and
regulated list of options, as is the way in real life. Our result indicates that a third party capa-
ble of controlling incentives and membership can play a key role in selecting a cooperation
equilibrium without ex ante adjustment. The question of how such a social order can emerge
out of a world of chaos is left entirely open.
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Appendix
A.1 Uniqueness of the Interior Equilibrium Q
We show that zQ is uniquely determined in the general case for n > 2. Both equations in
Eq. (15) have at most one solution with respect to z. Because fQ is independent of zQ, it is
sufficient to show that H(f, z) is strictly monotonic for every z ∈ (0,1). We first consider
penalties. A straightforward computation yields
∂
∂z
H(f, z) = n − 1
(1 − f )(1 − zn−1)2
[
zn−2 − (f + (1 − f )z)n−2((1 − f ) + f zn−2)]
= (n − 1)z
n−2
(1 − f )(1 − zn−1)2
×
[
1 −
{(
f + (1 − f )z
z
)
(
(1 − f ) + f z)
}n−2
(1 − f ) + f zn−2
((1 − f ) + f z)n−2
]
. (26)
We note that
(
f + (1 − f )z
z
)(
(1−f )+f z) = 1+f (1−f )
(
z−2+ 1
z
)
= 1+f (1−f ) (1 − z)
2
z
> 1,
(27)
and
(1 − f ) + f zn−2
((1 − f ) + f z)n−2 ≥ 1. (28)
This inequality obviously holds for n = 2. By induction for every larger n, if it holds for n,
it must hold for n + 1 because
(1 − f ) + f zn+1
((1 − f ) + f z)n+1 −
(1 − f ) + f zn
((1 − f ) + f z)n =
f (1 − f )(1 − z)(1 − zn)
((1 − f ) + f z)n+1 > 0. (29)
Consequently, the square bracketed term in the last line of Eq. (26) is negative. Thus,
∂H(f, z)/∂z < 0 for every z ∈ (0,1). We now consider rewards and use the same argument
as above. This concludes our proof of the uniqueness of Q.
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A.2 The Saddle Point Q
We prove that for n > 2, Q is a saddle point. We first consider penalties using Eq. (11).
Because the square brackets in Eq. (11) vanish at Q, the Jacobian at Q is given by
JQ =
(
δf (1 − f )(H + f ∂H
∂f
) δf 2(1 − f ) ∂H
∂z
z(1 − z)[−A + δ((1 − 2f )H + f (1 − f ) ∂H
∂f
)] δf (1 − f )z(1 − z) ∂H
∂z
)∣∣∣
∣∣
Q
, (30)
where H = H(f, z) and A = (r − 1)c + δ. Using ∂H(f, z)/∂z < 0, H > 0, and A > 0,
which yields
detJQ = δf 2(1 − f )z(1 − z)
[
A + δfH(f, z)]∂H(f, z)
∂z
< 0. (31)
Therefore, Q is a saddle point.
We next consider rewards using Eq. (12). Similarly, we find that the Jacobian at Q is
given by
JQ =
⎛
⎝
δf (1 − f )(−H + (1 − f ) ∂H
∂f
) δf (1 − f )2 ∂H
∂z
−z(1 − z)[A + δ((1 − 2f )H + f (1 − f ) ∂H
∂f
)] δ − f (1 − f )z(1 − z) ∂H
∂z
⎞
⎠
∣
∣∣
∣∣
∣
Q
,
(32)
where H = H(1 − f, z) and A is as in Eq. (30). Using ∂H(1 − f, z)/∂z < 0, H > 0, and
A > 0, it follows again that detJQ < 0. Therefore, Q is a saddle point.
A.3 No Homoclinic Orbit of Q
First, we prove that a homoclinic loop that originates from and converges to Q does not exist.
Using the Poincaré–Bendixson theorem [30] and the uniqueness of an interior equilibrium,
we show that if it does exist, there must be a point p inside the loop such that both of its α-
and ω-limit sets include Q. This contradicts the fact that Q is a saddle point. Indeed, there
may be a section that cuts through Q such that the positive and negative orbits of p infinitely
often cross it; however, it is impossible for a sequence consisting of all the crossing points to
originate from and also converge to the saddle point Q. Hence, there is no homoclinic orbit
of Q.
Next, we show that orbits that form the unstable manifold of Q do not converge to the
same equilibrium (indeed, this is a sink). If they do, the closed region that is surrounded by
the orbits must include a point q such that its ω-limit set is Q. Using the Poincaré–Bendixson
theorem and the uniqueness of an interior equilibrium, the α-limit set for q must include Q;
this is a contradiction. Similarly, we can prove that the orbits that form the stable manifold
of Q do not issue from the same equilibrium.
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